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The historical and philosophical literatures on tyrannicide are voluminous. See, for 1 example, the classic Policraticus by John of Salisbury ([1159] 1909 ) and the extensive commentaries in the 849 years since its publication.
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Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.
William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II One of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.
Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince
INTRODUCTION
We have grown up with images of kings killed and emperors assassinated. Meanwhile, as scientific understanding of human behavior grows, new theories yield new insights. One of the grand insights of twentieth century social science -inherited from the Greeks --was the centrality of justice processes (Homans 1974; Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972; Jasso 1980) . The long reach of justice can be discerned in virtually all of human behavior, from love to crime, from gifts to revolution, from religious institutions to disasters.
In this paper, we use the lens of justice analysis to explore the old question, why kill Caesar? We use the axiomatization developed by Jasso in a long series of papers (starting in 1978 and 1980 and recently summarized in 2005, 2006b, and 2007 (and more briefly in 2006a) . This axiomatization distinguishes between societies which value cardinal things (like wealth and land) called materialistic societies --and societies which value ordinal things (like beauty and intelligence) --called nonmaterialistic societies. But the engine is the same for both, namely, the justice force.
The justice axiomatization begins with the four central questions in the study of justice, as compiled by Jasso and Wegener (1997) The work reported in this paper falls under the fourth central question but uses the building-blocks developed to address the other questions, notably the justice evaluation function, which addresses the third question and in theoretical justice analysis operates as first postulate.
There is a large literature on the fourth central question, often referred to as the literature on reactions to injustice (Hegtvedt 2006) . Examples include Adams (1965) , Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) , and Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo (1997) , as well as Jasso's theoretical work on justice and comparison processes, some of which is referenced in this paper. For more general overviews of justice analysis, see Hegtvedt (2006) and Jasso (2006a) . Besides the literature on reactions to injustice, there is another large literature on ideas about what is just (addressing the first central question). Hegtvedt (2006:47) and Jasso (2007:339, 343-344) show how the justice evaluation function serves as a bridge that connects the two literatures.
For a long time, perhaps all of the twentieth century, it was known that not all persons or societies fall under the aegis of justice. Like the tone-deaf or color-blind, some persons seem justice-oblivious, as do the societies they form.
And, similarly, for a long time it was unclear how justice is related to other basic processes, such as status and power. Indeed, some authors used the terms interchangeably, while for others one or the other had primacy. Certainly everyone agreed that all three candidates for basic forces -status, justice, power -are responsive to the same human characteristics. Wealth, for example, increases status, and it pushes toward unjust overreward, and it increases power. So do beauty, intelligence, and skills of all kinds (athletic, musical, artistic). There is a status hierarchy, and a power hierarchy, and a justice hierarchy (though sometimes "continuum" is used instead of "hierarchy").
Status and power, like justice, are also addressed by large literatures. For brief introduction to status theory, see Berger and Webster (2006) , Jasso (2001b), and Ridgeway (2006) . Jasso and Kotz (2007) describe how the mathematical foundation for studying status was laid by Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1966) , Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch (1977), Goode (1978) , and So /rensen (1979) . Jasso (2004) proposes a list of four central questions in the study of status. The work reported in this paper addresses the fourth question, which, paralleling the list in justice analysis, is: "What are the behavioral and social consequences of according and receiving status and of discrepancies between expected and received status?"
The literatures on power are voluminous. For example, one literature can be traced to the classic paper by Emerson (1962) and brief introduction to more than forty years of elaboration and extension is provided by Cook, Cheshire, and Gerbasi (2006) .
The early 21 century has brought a possible solution to the puzzle of the exact relations st among the three candidate forces -justice, status, and power. This possible solution rests on the suggestion that they each have distinctive rates of change (Jasso 2007, in press) . Although all three are increasing functions of the same things (such as wealth or beauty), they each increase at a distinctive rate. Jasso's axiomatization of justice includes a proof that the justice evaluation Power is widely thought to increase with personal quantitative characteristics -such as 2 wealth -but the research record is sparse with respect to the form of the function . Thus, the power force is compatible with a constant rate of change.
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increases as the logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward to the just reward, thus implying that justice increases at a decreasing rate with the valued good (Jasso 1990 ). The axiomatization of status based on the Goode-So /rensen formulation proposes that status increases at an increasing rate with the valued good (Jasso 2001b) . Thus, if power is truly a distinct force -and not merely another name for status, or for justice -it must increase at a constant rate. To visualize the 2 distinctive rates of change, Figure 1 depicts the three sociobehavioral forces in a 12-person group which values an ordinal good.
- Figure 1 about hereThis proposed solution led to a new unified theory with its own new axiomatization and a new view of the three sociobehavioral forces as not only fundamental but also, and importantly, in competition with each other for the hearts and minds of persons and the societies they form.
The justice-oblivious may be votaries of status or acolytes of power.
As well, the new unified theory suggests that each of the three sociobehavioral forces generates, during the time it is active, identity and happiness. Accordingly, it follows that correct understanding of the sense of justice is not possible without understanding its rivals, for to understand justice is to understand its boundaries and limitations. In this paper, we thus explore the question, Why kill Caesar? using not only the justice lens but also the status and power lenses. As will be seen, this approach enables a strong conclusion about the part played by justice processes in "killing Caesar."
As noted, in justice theory, people and societies can be materialistic or nonmaterialistic.
So, too, in power societies; people can care about wealth or about beauty, the first treated as a cardinal good and the second as an ordinal good. Not so in the world of status. The GoodeSo /rensen formulation asserts that status notices only relative ranks; the status votary may care about wealth but only in the form of wealth rank, not in the form of wealth amount. Thus, in the new unified theory of sociobehavioral forces, there are five main types of societies: justicematerialistic, justice-nonmaterialistic, status, power-materialistic, and power-nonmaterialistic.
The killing-Caesar model we develop notices only ranks. Thus, we explore three possible kinds of societies: justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-nonmaterialistic. It is possible, of course, to examine killing Caesar in a materialistic regime, but we think it less natural and leave it to a future exercise.
Further, we must consider an alternative to killing Caesar. The alternative we choose is enslaving Caesar. Empirically, enslaving can take the form of house arrest, imprisonment, or actual enslavement. The important feature of enslavement is that Caesar topples from top rank to bottom rank.
Finally, our results are general and can be applied to many different kinds of real-world situations. For example, the focal group can be a set of conspirators or an entire society.
Similarly, the setting can be a country, an association, a club. In some contexts, the killingCaesar option is equivalent to permanent exile. We leave to future work a further analysis to distinguish between killing and exiling Caesar, while noting that in some contexts, such as clubs, throwing someone out of the club is the operational equivalent of killing Caesar.
THEORETICAL SETUP

Elements of the Setup Common to All Three Kinds of Societies
Consider a group with N members. The members all value the same good -such as wealth, land, cattle, military prowess, bravery, or horsemanship. If the good is cardinal (such as wealth, land, or head of cattle), the members value its ordinal manifestation. Accordingly, the N members are ranked, with the rank i going from 1 for the lowest-ranked to N for the highestranked. The sociobehavioral force generates a score for each person -such as a magnitude of status or of the justice evaluation -and also generates an identity and a magnitude of happiness (Jasso 2007, in press ).
In the situation we explore, the highest-ranked person -Caesar --is overthrown.
Empirically, this can be the work of all the other members, or of a subset of conspirators, or even of an outsider. The group remains intact (except for Caesar's unseating); no outsider becomes a member.
The top-ranked person may, but need not, be a ruler; if a ruler, the top-ranked person may be tyrannical or beneficent. Obviously, the case of the tyrant is the classic case discussed by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, John of Salisbury, Aquinas, and others in their analyses of sedition as a response to injustice. "Without justice, what are kingdoms but great robberies," asks Augustine (City of God, Book IV, Ch 4). And Aquinas (Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 42, art. 2), analyzing the morality of tyrannicide, notes, "It is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition." Again, the model is applicable to any group or society with a hierarchy based on a valued ordinal characteristic. Caesar is the top-ranked person in the group's hierarchy.
Killing Caesar -what happens to group size and own rank? It is obvious that in the killing scenario, group size diminishes by one. Formally, group size at Time 1 is N; at Time 2 it is N-1. Given that the top person is killed, own rank stays the same for all other group members.
Formally, own rank is i at both Time 1 and Time 2.
Enslaving Caesar -what happens to group size and own rank? In this scenario it is obvious that group size stays the same. Formally, group size is N at both Time 1 and Time 2.
Own rank, however, increases by one for all group members, given that Caesar is now the lowest-ranked person. Formally, own rank is i at Time 1 and increases to i+1 at Time 2.
To analyze the effects on each group member, we use the technique of theoretical derivation known as the micromodel strategy. The basic idea is that an event -in this case, killing or enslaving Caesar -produces a change in each group member's well-being by altering the justice, status, or power score. The change may be positive or negative; that is, individuals may become better-off or worse-off as a result of the focal event. This technique has been used For comprehensive exposition of the micromodel and an extended example, see Jasso 3 (2001a); for two additional extended examples, see Jasso (2004 Jasso ( , 2006b ).
The relative ranks have several appealing properties. First, their arithmetic mean is 4 exactly one-half. Second, the first and Nth relative ranks are equidistant from 0 and 1, respectively, and also from the mean. Third, the elements of each subrange pair (e.g., 2 and N-1) are equidistant from 0 and 1, respectively, and also from the mean.
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to analyze effects of gifts, theft, disasters, and so on. The unsubscripted relative rank is equivalent to the "actual" relative rank in the justice 5 evaluation. While status is generated by the actual rank alone, the justice evaluation is generated by comparison of the actual relative rank to the "just" relative rank.
(6)
Applying to formula (5) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CJ in the two scenarios:
Caesar Model in a Status Society
The status version of the Caesar model begins with the first postulate of status theory, the status function (also known as the S1 function):
where S denotes status and r denotes relative rank. Replacing r by its approximation i/(N+1) where, as before, the subscripts "1" and "2" denote Time 1 and Time 2, respectively. Formula (9) reduces to:
Applying to formula (10) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CS in the two scenarios:
Caesar Model in a Power Society
The power version of the Caesar model begins with the first postulate of the fledgling power theory. Here power increases at a constant rate with the valued good. For ordinal goods, power increases at a constant rate with relative rank:
where P denotes power and, as before, r denotes relative rank. Replacing r by its approximation i/(N+1) yields:
The change in power from Time 1 to Time 2 is denoted CP and written:
Applying to formula (14) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CP in the two 
Analyzing CJ, CS, and CP
To assess the effects of killing versus enslaving Caesar, we pose the following questions:
1. For each group member, is the change in well-being (CJ, CS, or CP) positive or negative?
What is the ceteris paribus effect of own rank i on CJ, CS, and CP?
What is the ceteris paribus effect of group size N on CJ, CS, and CP?
4. Under which scenario -killing or enslaving Caesar -are group members better-off?
To answer the first question, we evaluate the sign of formulas (6), (11), and (15) for CJ, CS, and CP in the two scenarios. To answer the second and third questions, we obtain the first partial derivatives of the six formulas in (6), (11), and (15) with respect to own rank and group size. Finally, to answer the fourth question, we set up and solve the inequality formed by the formulas for the two scenarios in each of the three force-regimes.
THEORETICAL RESULTS
Do Group Members Become Better-Off When Caesar Is Killed or Enslaved?
Evaluating the sign of the six change formulas (panel A of Table 1) indicates that all six are positive. Lingering over the results for the justice-nonmaterialistic regime, it is easy to see that CJ is positive because in both the killing and the enslaving cases, CJ is the logarithm of a ratio and the numerator of the ratio is larger than the denominator. The same is true in the two status cases. The formulas in the two power cases are obviously positive. Thus, when Caesar is killed or enslaved, under all three force-regimes, every group member becomes better-off.
- Table 1 
Does Own Rank Affect the Gain from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?
Inspecting the change formulas in Table 1 , it is evident that own rank has no effect on CJ in the killing case and on CP in the enslaving case, as it does not appear in the formulas. In the other four cases we take the first partial derivatives of the change formulas with respect to i and find that the effect is negative in the justice-enslaving case and positive in both status cases and the power-killing case. Thus, holding constant group size, the gains are equal in two cases and unequal in the other four. Moreover, in the unequal cases, we find both a case where lowerranked members reap greater gains than higher-ranked members and three cases where the opposite occurs. These results are collected in panel B of Table 1. Expressed formally, we have the second theoretical result which we report as a set of results and which, because it is based on partial derivatives, pertains to the case where group size is held constant (including, of course, application to a single society): If persons with greater gains are more likely to lead the mutiny or insurrection, then the higher-ranking always lead the revolution in a status society and sometimes in a powernonmaterialistic society, but never in a justice-nonmaterialistic society. In a justicenonmaterialistic society, the leaders of the rebellion will come from the bottom or randomly from across all ranks.
Does Group Size Affect the Gain from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?
Inspection of the change formulas shows that group size has no effect on CJ in the enslaving case, as it does not appear in the formula. In the other five cases we take the first partial derivatives of the change formulas with respect to N and find that the effect is negative in all five. These results are summarized in Panel C of Thus, these results indicate that, with the exception of the justice-enslaving case (the case where group size has no effect), the gains are larger in small societies, suggesting that toppling Caesar is a phenomenon of relatively small groups.
Is the Gain Larger from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?
Solving the inequality within each force-regime, we find that the gains are always larger 
If the Gain Is Always Greater under the Enslaving Option, Why Kill Caesar?
These results suggest that a plausible answer involves the desire for equality, the desire, that is, to achieve equal gains. As we have seen, equal gains are only possible in a justice society. So we may speculate that killing Caesar only occurs in a justice society and that the reason it occurs is to ensure that all group members reap equal gains.
DISCUSSION
Shakespeare was right. The ruler -or any top-ranked person -is vulnerable on many fronts and especially vulnerable to removal. Moreover, our results suggest that the people's gain from unseating the ruler is always positive. Thus, Machiavelli's prescription to gain the esteem of the people as a buffer against conspirators requires measures from beyond the ordinary world of sociobehavioral forces -measures to substantially offset the gain from unseating Caesar.
Our analysis indicates that although everyone gains, the gains are not necessarily equal for all group members. In one scenario -enslaving Caesar in a justice-nonmaterialistic regimethe lower-ranked reap greater gains, while in three scenarios -killing Caesar in a powernonmaterialistic regime and always in a status regime -the opposite occurs, namely, the higherranked reap greater gains. There are two scenarios, however, in which all gains are equalsenslaving Caesar in a power-nonmaterialistic regime and killing Caesar in a justice-nonmaterialistic regime.
Group size also matters, according to our results. In five of the six scenarios, the gains from overthrowing Caesar are greater in small groups than in large groups. In the sixth scenario, the gains do not vary by group size. Thus, toppling Caesar would seem to be a phenomenon of small groups -not only small societies but also small sets of conspirators.
Finally, we asked the question that has fired the universal imagination, Why kill Caesar?
We established that in all three societies examined -justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and powernonmaterialistic -group members reap greater gains from enslaving than from killing Caesar.
Thus, it would seem that no insightful conspirator, no rebel who has studied the historical record, would kill Caesar. Rather, Caesar would be imprisoned or exiled, like Napoleon, or even reeducated, like the last emperor of China.
Alas, justice theory suggests a reason for killing rather than enslaving Caesar. In a justice-nonmaterialistic world, the gains from removing Caesar are equal if and only if Caesar is killed. In a power-nonmaterialistic world, remember, the gains from removing Caesar are equal if and only if Caesar is enslaved. Thus, there are in general two paths to achieve equal gains.
But in a world already under the aegis of justice, only a single path to equal gains remainskilling Caesar. Thus we speculate that Caesar is killed only in a justice-nonmaterialistic regime and with the otherwise noble purpose of achieving equality.
These are all theoretical predictions, of course, and subject to empirical test. Moreover, it is important to obtain parallel results for the two other kinds of societies, the materialistic justice and power societies. If it turns out that among all five basic types of societies, only the two justice societies yield equal gains from killing Caesar, then these results provide the beginnings of a fresh interpretation of the historical record. In that long line of slain tyrants, the societies valued justice, and equality was the killers' motive. If only the justice-nonmaterialistic society yields equal gains from killing Caesar, then there is additional information about the dominance of ordinal valued goods. Further, it is important as well to obtain results for societies which combine elements of the five ideal types, as such results would place further necessary and Jasso (in press) suggests that persons can be characterized by the configuration of 6 quantitative characteristics, qualitative characteristics, and sociobehavioral forces in their identities, and societies by the configuration of elements in their members' identities. The individual's configuration is termed personality, and the society's configuration is termed culture. Jasso (in press) goes on to suggest that one of the ensuing empirical challenges is to correctly describe real-world societies in terms of these configurations of personal quantitative characteristics, personal qualitative characteristics, and sociobehavioral forces. For further discussion of the general empirical challenges that arise in testing the predictions of deductive theories, see Jasso (2004 Jasso ( , 2006b ).
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sufficient conditions on the links between tyrannicide and the three sociobehavioral forces. 6 Thus, the work reported in this paper serves to highlight new directions of inquiry and to underscore yet again the long reach of the three sociobehavioral forces and the possible primacy of justice.
These results also lead to a further speculation. If everyone gains from removing Caesar, then perhaps no second-in-command or third-in-command will participate in removing Caesar, for they would themselves immediately become vulnerable to removal. The best defense against removal may well be the knowledge that mortal threat comes with the top rank, and whoever holds top rank is thereby vulnerable.
